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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Edward Nicholas Bursiel appeals from the district court’s orders revoking
his probation and denying his motion for credit for time served.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Forty-six-year-old Bursiel posted a personal ad on the “Casual
Encounters” section of Craigslist in which he “claimed to be looking for sexual
encounters with, ‘Any race, size, or age. I don’t care.’” (PSI, p.3.) Posing as a
14-year-old girl named “Nicki Scott,” a detective responded to the ad. (Id.) Over
the next six days Bursiel engaged in online conversations with “Nicki” and told
her “she was not too young,” and he had previously “been with a 14 year old”
and “enjoyed teaching her things.” (Id.) He also “sent [“Nicki”] a picture of his
erect penis and explained in detail how he would make her feel ‘good’ without it
hurting.” (Id.) Bursiel and “Nicki” arranged to meet but, before Bursiel arrived at
the designated meeting place, officers stopped him and arrested him for child
enticement. (Id.) At the time of his arrest Bursiel had “two packs of lubricant and
two condoms in the center console” of his vehicle. (Id.)
The state charged Bursiel with one count of felony enticing a child through
the use of the Internet and one count of misdemeanor disseminating material
harmful to minors. (R., pp.65-66.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bursiel pled
guilty to the felony enticement charge and the state dismissed the misdemeanor.
(7/14/14 Tr., p.4, L.3 – p.8, L.21.) The district court initially imposed a unified
sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.159-
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63.) With the consent of both parties, and consistent with the terms of the plea
agreement that were put on the record at Bursiel’s change of plea hearing, the
district court later modified the underlying sentence to a unified sentence of 13
years, with three years fixed.1 (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.307-08, 310-23.)
On March 20, 2015, following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district
court suspended the balance of Bursiel’s sentence and placed him on probation
for a period of three years.

(Lim. R., vol. I, pp.37-56.)

Bursiel thereafter

transferred his probation supervision to the state of Washington through an
Interstate Compact agreement.

(Lim. R., vol. I, p.59.)

On June 26, 2015,

Bursiel’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging Bursiel had violated
his probation by having access to and using the internet, including by having
password-protected files and email accounts and by “access[ing] the internet for
sex”; having unauthorized contact with his minor son; engaging in casual sexual
relationships with women he invited to his residence “for sex”; “hiding and lying

1

Bursiel timely appealed from the original judgment (see R., pp.167-70) and, for
the first time on appeal, argued the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
recommending a sentence different than that contemplated by the agreement
(See, generally, Brief of Appellant, filed July 20, 2015). Pursuant to the state’s
motion, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to
make factual findings regarding the terms of the plea agreement. (Lim. R., vol.
II, p.283; Motion for Remand and Statement in Support Thereof, filed Dec. 30,
2015.) On remand, the district court found that the terms of the non-binding plea
agreement required the prosecutor to recommend an underlying unified
sentence of 13 years, with three years fixed, but that, at sentencing, the
prosecutor unintentionally misstated the agreement as calling for a
recommendation of 10 years, with five years fixed. (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.310-13.)
Because the court “specifically adopted the State’s recommendations as to the
underlying sentence without realizing that the State had misstated the plea
agreement,” the court “correct[ed] its judgment to reflect” the sentence it found
the state was obligated to recommend. (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.310-23.)
2

about information he had provided to” his supervising officer(s); failing to “seek
and maintain gainful employment as directed”; and purchasing and consuming
alcohol. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.59-63.) The district court issued a bench warrant for
the probation violations, and the warrant was served on Bursiel at the Benton
County Jail in Kennewick, Washington, on July 2, 2015. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.9298.)

After Bursiel waived extradition and was arraigned on the probation

violation allegations, the district court granted Bursiel’s request for a bond
reduction on the condition that Bursiel “not leave the state of Idaho.” (Lim. R.,
vol. I, pp.104-07, 118-20.) Bursiel posted bond and was released from custody
on August 7, 2015. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.122-26.)
On September 28, 2015, while the original probation violation allegations
were still pending, Bursiel’s probation officer submitted another report of violation
alleging that Bursiel had “left his known and approved residence” on or about
August 27, 2015, and had since effectively “absconded from probation.” (Lim.
R., vol. I, pp.152-53.) On October 27, 2015, Bursiel’s probation officer filed an
addendum to September report of violation alleging that, since leaving his
approved residence, Bursiel had committed two new crimes: Failure to register
as a sex offender in Kootenai County, and “Harassment (Threat to Kill) DV in
Spokane County Washington.” (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.186-87; see also pp.151, 16782, 190-203.)
Following an evidentiary hearing on the allegations in all three reports of
violation, the district court found Bursiel willfully violated his probation by
accessing and using the internet, engaging in casual sexual relationships,
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purchasing and consuming alcohol, and being found guilty of felony Criminal
Mischief (amended from Harassment (Threat to Kill) DV) in Spokane County,
Washington. (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.292-96, 298-301, 303-05.) The court revoked
Bursiel’s probation, executed his underlying sentence of 13 years, with three
years fixed, and ordered that Bursiel “be given credit for all time served on [the
child enticement] charge(s).” (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.326-28, 361-63.) Bursiel filed a
timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.
(Lim. R., vol. II, pp.364-65, 374-81, 382-86.)
On the same day the court entered its order revoking Bursiel’s probation,
the state filed a “Motion Re Establishing Credit For Time Served.” (Lim. R., vol.
II, pp.331-32.) Following a hearing on the motion, the district court entered an
order giving Bursiel 353 days credit for time served. (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.393-96.)
Approximately three and a half months later, Bursiel filed a pro se motion
seeking additional credit for time served. (Aug., pp.1-6.) Specifically, Bursiel
requested credit toward his sentence for the time he spent incarcerated in the
Benton County Jail before he was served with the bench warrant for the
probation violations alleged in the June 26, 2015 report of violation. (Aug., pp.36.) The district court denied the motion without a hearing, noting there had
already been a hearing to establish Bursiel’s entitlement to credit for time served,
and stating, “the issue of credit for time served has already been decided.”
(Aug., pp.7-8.)

4

Bursiel timely appealed both from the district court’s order revoking his
probation and from its order denying his motion for credit for time served.
(R., pp.167-70; Lim. R., vol. II, pp.366-68.)
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ISSUES
Bursiel states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked
probation and executed Mr. Bursiel’s sentence?

2.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bursiel 68 days of
credit for time served?

(Revised Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Bursiel failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation after he demonstrated multiple times and in
multiple ways (including by committing a new felony) that probation was
neither serving its rehabilitative purpose nor consistent with the protection
of society?

2.

Should this case be remanded to the district court for the limited purpose
of considering the merits of Bursiel’s Rule 35 motion for additional credit
for time served?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
Bursiel Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Revoking His Probation
A.

Introduction
After finding that Bursiel violated his probation on multiple occasions and

in multiple ways, including by committing a new felony crime, the district court
revoked Bursiel’s probation and executed his underlying sentence. (Lim. R., vol.
II, pp.292-96, 298-301, 303-05, 326-28, 361-63.) Contrary to Bursiel’s assertions
on appeal, a review of the record supports the district court’s determination that
probation was neither serving its rehabilitative purpose nor consistent with the
protection of society.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992). “When a
trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,
600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
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C.

The Record Supports The District Court’s Decision To Revoke Bursiel’s
Probation Because The Probation Was Neither Consistent With The
Protection Of Society Nor Achieving Its Rehabilitative Purpose
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-

2601(4). The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the
district court. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App.
1987); State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992). When
deciding whether to revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether
the probation [was] achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with
the protection of society.”

Drennen, 122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701.

Contrary to Bursiel’s assertions on appeal, application of these legal standards to
the facts of this case shows the district court acted well within its discretion when
it revoked Bursiel’s probation.
Bursiel is not an appropriate candidate for probation.

The child

enticement charge of which he was convicted in this case arose after Bursiel
trolled the Internet for someone of “‘[a]ny race, size, or age’” with whom to have
a sexual encounter. (PSI, p.3.) When someone Bursiel believed was a 14-yearold girl responded to Bursiel’s ad, Bursiel engaged her in sexually explicit
conversations, sent her a picture of his erect penis and arranged to meet her for
sex. (Id.)
Upon initially sentencing Bursiel, the district court indicated it was “looking
at all four” objectives of sentencing, including the protection of society. (9/5/14
Tr., p.22, Ls.9-15.) The court was concerned by Bursiel’s criminal record, which
included two prior felony convictions – including a conviction for manufacturing
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and possessing an explosive device for which Bursiel spent 40 months in federal
prison – as well as two misdemeanor convictions and other charges, such as
assault and domestic violence, that indicated to the court that Bursiel had
“issues” or “problems” with women. (9/5/14 Tr., p.22, L.23 – p.23, L.4; PSI, pp.46.) “The most concerning thing to the Court,” however, was the psychosexual
evaluation which indicated that Bursiel had “a problem and a lack of recognition
and a need for treatment” that would best be accomplished in a prison setting.
(9/5/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.16-19; see also Psychosexual Eval., pp.1, 20 (opining
Bursiel “has a low amenability for treatment” and “would be a good candidate for
a prison based program”).) Despite Bursiel’s concerning criminal history and the
psychosexual evaluator’s determination that Bursiel was not a candidate for
community based treatment, the district court retained jurisdiction, thereby giving
Bursiel the opportunity to prove himself worthy of probation. (9/5/14 Tr., p.23,
L.5 – p.24, L.5.)
Although Bursiel successfully completed his period of retained jurisdiction
(Lim. R., vol. I, pp.37-39), whatever rehabilitative strides he may have made in
the program were extremely short-lived. Less than two months after Bursiel was
placed on probation and was allowed to transfer his supervision to the state of
Washington, Bursiel’s roommate, Robert Hollomon, reported to Bursiel’s
supervising officers that Bursiel had “accessed the internet for sex and also had
email accounts,” “had unauthorized contact with his minor son” on two different
occasions, “had invited women over [to] their residence for sex,” “had been
hiding and lying about information he had provided to” his supervising officers,
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and “had purchased/consumed alcohol.”

(Lim. R., vol. I, pp.59-63.)

Mr.

Hollomon provided the officers with Bursiel’s computer and smart phone, both of
which were password-protected.

(Lim. R., vol. I, pp.60, 69.)

After giving

deceptive responses during a polygraph test, Bursiel ultimately “admitted to
internet use.” (Lim. R., vol. I, p.60.)
Bursiel was arrested on the probation violation allegations and, after
waiving extradition, was transported back to Idaho. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.92-99,
104-05.) After an arraignment, the district court granted Bursiel’s request for
bond reduction on the condition that, if he bonded out, Bursiel was “not [to] leave
the state of Idaho.” (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.104-07, 118-20.) Bursiel bonded out on
August 7, 2015. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.122-26.) Within a month thereafter, Bursiel
left his approved residence and returned to the state of Washington, where he
again resided with Mr. Hollomon. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.152-53, 169-82, 190-203.)
In October 2015, Mr. Hollomon learned there was an outstanding warrant for
Bursiel’s arrest, and he asked Bursiel to move out. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.170, 17374.) Bursiel threatened to kill Mr. Hollomon if Mr. Hollomon turned him in, and he
claimed that, for $500, he could hire someone to come through town and “attack
Hollomon at the railroad tracks.” (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.170, 173-74.) Mr. Hollomon
was afraid for his life and called the police. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.170, 173-74.)
When the police arrived at the residence, Bursiel was holed up in a travel trailer
that was parked in the driveway and only came out after a SWAT team deployed
two rounds of a “chemical agent” into the trailer. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.171, 174-78.)
Bursiel was initially charged with “Harassment (Threat to Kill) DV” for having
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threatened Mr. Hollomon’s life (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.179-81), but he was ultimately
found guilty of felony criminal mischief (2/2/16 Tr., p.52, L.2 – p.54, L.1; Lim. R.,
vol. II, p.305).
In deciding to revoke Bursiel’s probation, the district court specifically
recognized that its first priority was “the protection of society.” (3/11/16 Tr., p.14,
Ls.11-14.) The court noted that Bursiel had been given “a number of chances”
to succeed on probation but, on each occasion, he “broke[] the trust of the Court
and of the Department of Probation” by failing to abide by the conditions of his
probation, including by committing new crimes. (3/11/16 Tr., p.11, L.14 – p.12,
L.10, p.14, Ls.11-13.)

The court reiterated Bursiel’s criminal history and the

psychosexual evaluator’s findings, even before sentencing, that “Bursiel has
demonstrated a pattern of poor decisions that has contributed to his criminal
behavior” and “has a low amenability for treatment.” (3/11/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-22,
p.13, Ls.6-12 (internal quotations omitted).)

Considering that information,

together with the number and nature of Bursiel’s probation violations, the district
court found in an exercise of discretion that revoking Bursiel’s probation and
executing his sentence was necessary both to protect society and to further
Bursiel’s rehabilitation. (3/11/16 Tr., p.13, L.17 – p.14, L.21.)
On appeal, Bursiel cites his military service, employment history, and
purported remorse as factors he claims the court failed to properly consider
when it revoked his probation. (Revised Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) All of this
information was before the court and considered both at the time of sentencing
and at the disposition hearing. (See 9/5/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17 (district court
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indicated it had reviewed the presentence report and psychosexual evaluation);
3/11/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.17-20 (court rendering decision “in light of the information
that has been provided in the presentence investigation report, the psychosexual
evaluation, [Bursiel’s] past history, and [his] commission of crimes”).)

That

Bursiel disagrees with how the district court weighed the evidence and balanced
the objectives of sentencing does not show an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) (“In this case, Windom
essentially asks this Court to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court
and reach a different conclusion …. However, our role is not to reweigh the
evidence considered by the district court; our role is to determine whether
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district court.”).
Bursiel also largely ignores the facts that support the court’s decision to revoke
his probation – i.e., the number and nature of Bursiel’s probation violations –
including the commission of new crimes, his complete disregard for the terms of
probation and the orders of the court, and his failure to demonstrate any
rehabilitative progress while in the community. Given any reasonable view of the
facts, Bursiel has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation.
II.
This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court For Consideration Of The
Merits Of Bursiel’s Rule 35 Motion For Additional Credit For Time Served
On the same day the court entered its order revoking Bursiel’s probation,
the state filed a “Motion Re Establishing Credit For Time Served.” (Lim. R., vol.
II, pp.331-332.)

The state asserted that, as of the date of the disposition
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hearing, Bursiel “had accrued a total of 353 days credit for time served,” which
calculation included, inter alia, the time Bursiel spent in custody between July 8,
2015 – the date the state asserted Bursiel was arrested on the bench warrant
2
issued in connection with his first alleged probation violations – and August 7,

2015 – the date he posted bond and was released from custody. (Lim. R., vol. II,
pp.331-32.) Following a hearing on the motion, the district court entered an
order giving Bursiel 353 days credit for time served. (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.393-96.)
Approximately three and a half months later, Bursiel filed a pro se motion
seeking additional credit for time served. (Aug., pp.1-6.) Specifically, Bursiel
requested credit toward his sentence for the time he spent incarcerated in the
Benton County Jail before he was served with the bench warrant for the
probation violations alleged in the June 26, 2015 report of violation. (Aug., pp.34.) In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, Bursiel represented that he was
incarcerated in the Benton County Jail from May 1, 2015, until July 16, 2015, and
that his incarceration was attributable solely to the probation violations he was
alleged to have committed in this case. (Aug., pp.3-4.) He also attached to his
motion a “Jail Time Certification” from the Benton County Sheriff’s Office
showing that he was in fact incarcerated in the Benton County Jail from May 1,
2015, until July 16, 2015. (Aug. p.6.)

The district court denied the motion

without a hearing, stating as the bases for its ruling that there had already been a

2

It appears from the record that the warrant was actually served on July 2, 2015.
(See Lim. R., vol. I, pp.92-98.)
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hearing to establish Bursiel’s entitlement to credit for time served, and that “the
issue of credit for time served has already been decided.” (Aug., pp.7-8.)
On appeal, Bursiel argues the district court erred by denying his pro se
motion for additional credit for time served because the factual assertions Bursiel
made in the motion and accompanying affidavit “are supported by the record”
and demonstrate that he is entitled under I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-227 to credit
for the time he served in custody on the probation violation allegations in this
case, even before the bench warrant issued in connection with those allegations
was served. (Revised Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.) The state does not concede
that Bursiel is actually entitled to any of the credit he seeks. However, the state
does acknowledge that Bursiel is entitled, as a matter of law, to credit for every
day he served in custody following an arrest on the probation violations in this
case, if such arrest was made pursuant to I.C. § 20-227. See I.C. § 19-2603
(“The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a
bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, [or] for any time served following
an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227 ….”).

The state also

acknowledges that, in State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 21, 319 P.3d 501, 505 (Ct.
App. 2014), the Court of Appeals expressly held that “a district court may only
give credit for the correct amount of time actually served by the defendant” and
that “the district court does not have discretion to award credit for time served
that is either more or less than that.” Moreover, “[t]he district court is not bound
to accept either party’s calculations of the appropriate credit for time served in a
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Rule 35(c) motion. Instead, it is the district court’s duty to determine the accurate
credit for time served as reflected by the record and award that time
accordingly.” Id.
In light of Moore and the statutes that govern a defendant’s entitlement to
credit for time served, the state concedes the district court erred by not
considering the merits of Bursiel’s Rule 35 motion seeking additional credit for
time served. Although the state does not concede Bursiel is actually entitled to
more credit than has already been awarded, the state submits this case should
be remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of considering and ruling
on the merits of Bursiel’s motion for additional credit.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order revoking Bursiel’s probation and that the case be remanded to the district
court for consideration of the merits of Bursiel’s Rule 35 motion for credit for time
served.
DATED this 10th day of November, 2016.
_/s/ Lori A. Fleming______
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of November, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing REVISED BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by
emailing an electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

LAF/dd

_/s/ Lori A. Fleming______
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

16

